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Don't Ask Us to Explain Ourselves, 
Don't Tell Us What to Do: 
The Boy Scouts' Exclusion of Gay 
Members and the Necessity of 
Independent Judicial Review 
by 
Taylor Flynn 
In the wake of the United it has rejected the claims of 
States Supreme Court's 
decision, Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale,I civil rights 
advocates may want to take 
heed of the Boy Scout motto 
''Be Prepared,,2-prepared to 
see antidiscrimination statutes 
rendered toothless in many 
instances. In an opinion 
authored by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court held by a 
five to four majority that the 
Boy Scouts of America3 is 
entitled to ban gay persons 
from membership despite New 
Jersey's prohibition against 
sexual orientation discrimi-
The Dale Court takes the 
model of a judiciary 
neutral with respect to the 
marketplace of ideas and 
distorts it into a judiciary 
powerless to accord 
sufficient weight to a 
state's interest in protecting 
civil rights. 
private clubs that application of 
civil rights laws to their 
membership policies violates 
their associational rights.5 
Instead, the Dale Court ruled that 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston6-which involved a 
quintessential speech claim 
concerning the right of a parade 
sponsor to exclude a contingent 
with whose message it 
disagreed-provided the relevant 
precedent.7 
In order to fit Dale into the 
Hurley mold, the Supreme Court 
accepted at face value the Boy 
Scouts' blanket declaration that 
compliance with the nondis-
nation.4 The Dale majority 
sharply departed from the 
Court's long line of expressive association cases, in which 
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crimination statute would violate the organization's moral 
values. In so doing, the Supreme Court simultaneously 
asked and answered the central issue before it: Whether 
the admission of gay members is contrary to the Boy 
Scouts' moral expression (and hence is constitutionally 
protected) or whether the Scouts' ban stems from mere 
prejudice (and hence arises from precisely the type of 
unprotected hostility which the legislation was designed to 
eradicate). My disagreement with the Dale Court's opinion 
lies not with the ultimate conclusion that courts may reach 
in such cases, but rather with the majority's assertion that 
courts may not reach any independent conclusion at all. 8 
In Part I of this Article, I argue that by "reading" the 
plaintiff in Dale as a cipher for gay sex, and by accepting 
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the Scouts' claim of conflict without further inquiry, the 
Supreme Court takes the model of a judiciary neutral with 
respect to the marketplace of ideas and distorts it into a 
judiciary powerless to accord sufficient weight to a state's 
interest in protecting civil rights. In Part II, I review 
evidence of the Boy Scouts' moral expression and 
demonstrate that there are ample grounds to support the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that the Scouts' 
exclusionary policy conflicts so directly with the 
organization's expressed views that the ban is explainable 
only by animus. I conclude with a concern for future civil 
rights litigation: that a state's nondiscrimination 
protections-particularly for groups not afforded 
heightened constitutional scrutiny-effectively may be 
eviscerated with nothing more than a potential excluder's 
say-so. 
1. AN ODD FORM OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
When is opposition to a class of persons grounded in 
one's moral views and when is it based simply on 
hostility? Is it even possible to harbor sheer enmity, 
devoid of ideological belief? While philosophers may 
wrestle with these questions, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
suggests that, at least for the purpose of constitutional 
interpretation, courts may characterize some acts of 
discrimination as grounded in nothing more than arbitrary 
dislike.9 If based on bare animosity, the Boy Scouts' ban 
would be essentially devoid of social or expressive value 
and would not outweigh the state's interest in combating 
discrimination-making the majority's "odd form of 
independent review,,10 the pivotal factor in the case. 
A. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS 
Prior to its decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 
the Supreme Court was faced on several occasions with the 
difficult question of whether the application of a civil rights 
law to a private organization's membership policy violated 
the entity's right of expressive association. The Supreme 
Court laid out its framework for analysis with respect to 
private clubs in Board of Directors of Rotary International 
v. Rotary Club of Duarte and Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees. I I In both Rotary and Jaycees, the defendant 
organizations had membership policies that specifically 
excluded women.12 In each case, the club claimed that 
application of a state's antidiscrimination statute to its 
policy violated the members' right of expressive 
association, and in each case, the Supreme Court rejected 
the defendant's argument. 13 First, the Supreme Court ruled 
that "public accommodations laws 'plainly serv[e] 
compelling state interests of the highest order,,,,14 are 
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and are the least 
restrictive means of achieving that compelling interest. 15 
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Given that the state had a narrowly tailored, 
compelling interest in its civil rights law, the defendant was 
required to demonstrate that its expressive activities were 
substantially burdened. In Rotary, the Court asked whether 
inclusion of the banned group would force the organization 
to "abandon or alter" its expressive activities or would 
"affect in any significant way the existing members' abilities 
to carry out their various purposes.,,16 Similarly, in Jaycees, 
the Court asked whether inclusion of women "impose[ d] 
any serious burdens,,17 on the club's shared goals and 
whether inclusion would "impede the organization's 
ability,,18 to engage in its expressive activities. In both 
cases, the Supreme Court concluded that any burden placed 
on the organization's right of expressive association did not 
rise to the level of substantiality necessary to overcome the 
state's interest in nondiscrimination. 
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion after 
careful review of the clubs' expressive activity and the 
degree to which this expression would be burdened by the 
inclusion of women. Both Rotary International and the 
Jaycees claimed that their restriction of membership to men 
was integral to their basic goals. Rotary stated that its 
organization was designed for "business and professional 
men,,,19 and the Jaycees similarly specified that it served the 
interests of "young men.,,20 In each case, the Court looked 
beyond the defendant's bare assertion, even in its written 
membership policy, that the organization's purpose was to 
serve the interests of men. Instead, the Court reviewed the 
evidence of the entities' expressive activities as a whole: 
Rotary International's efforts to "provide humanitarian 
service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, 
and help build goodwill and peace in the world,,,21 and the 
Jaycees' purposes to "inculcate ... a spirit of genuine 
Americanism and civic interest ... provide [an] opportunity 
for personal development and achievement . . . and to 
develop true friendship and understanding among young 
men of all nations.,,22 The Court also examined each 
organization's rationale for excluding women. Rotary 
International, for instance, asserted that it required all-male 
membership to "operate effectively" in foreign countries.23 
Rather than automatically credit such rationales, the Court 
in each case looked to the organization's wider expressive 
purposes and concluded that these purposes would not be 
substantially impaired by the admission of women. 
Even though Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, like 
Rotary and Jaycees, involved the clash between a state 
antidiscrimination statute and a private club's exclusion 
from membership of a statutorily protected group, the Dale 
majority's discussion of these cases was abbreviated and 
conclusory. The Dale Court stated, "[w]e recognized in 
[Rotary and Jaycees] that States have a compelling interest 
in eliminating discrimination.,,24 The Court then 
immediately attempted to distinguish Rotary and Jaycees by 
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stating, "in each of these cases we went on to conclude that 
the enforcement of these statutes would not materially 
interfere with -the ideas that the organization sought to 
express.,,25 Significantly, the Dale majoritY failed to 
mention that the Court had reached its conclusions in 
Rotary and Jaycees by refusing to accept the clubs' claims 
of impairment at face value?6 
In Dale, the Boy Scouts argued that their ban does not 
stem from hostility toward gay persons, but rather is based 
on their moral code: ''Boy Scouting does not have an 
antigay policy, it has a morally straight policy.,,27 The Boy 
Scouts framed the issue by asking whether a court should 
dictate what the Scouts believe, arguing that "it is not the 
role of government to decide what a private organization's 
message is" and that "a reviewing court must give deference 
to [the Scouts'] characterization of [their] own beliefs.,,28 
The Scouts similarly characterized the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's examination of the Boy Scouts' expression as the 
"reject[ion] [of] Boy Scouting's statements of its moral 
values and [the] substitut[ion][of] the court's own definition 
of Scouting's moral message.,,29 This theme 'Y~ echoed 
during oral argument, with members of the CoUrt asking 
questions such as "[W]ho is better qualified to determine 
the expressive purpose and expressive content of the Boy 
Scouts' message, the Boy Scouts or the New Jersey 
COUrts?,,30 
This depiction of the issue, I argue, plays on the 
semantic ambiguity of "determine." While a court cannot 
"determine" the Scouts' moral code, in the sense of 
prescribing its content, it is an essential role of the court to 
"determine," or find the facts. To be sure, it is not the role 
of a court to dictate what the elements of a party's moral 
beliefs should be. A court can no more order the Boy 
Scouts to believe that homosexuality is "morally straight" 
than it could tell the Ku Klux Klan to adopt a message of 
racial tolerance. But it is precisely the Court's role to 
ascertain whether a precept of the Scouts' moral views is 
that homosexuality is immoral. The Dale majority, 
however, concluded that the Supreme Court is affirmatively 
prohibited from determining whether there was evidence to 
support the defendant's claimed exemption from the civil 
rights law. Calling the evidence of the Scouts' moral 
viewpoint merely "instructive," Chief Justice Rehnquist 
chided the New Jersey Supreme Court for its review of the 
evidence, declaring that "it is not the role of the courts to 
reject a group's expressed values because they disagree 
with those values or find them internally inconsistent.,,31 
Instead, based on a quote from the Boy Scouts' brief, the 
majority stated, "We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion 
[that the ban is based on their moral beliefs]. We need not 
inquire further.'.32 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements in Dale that the 
outcome of a claim may not tum on the court's view of the 
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content of the message, and that an organization need not 
articulate its views with consistency or clarity to receive 
First Amendment protection, are simply an unremarkable 
recitation of free expression doctrine?3 In contrast, 
Rehnquist's declaration that the Supreme Court need look 
no further than the excluder's unsupported assertion that 
its policy is based on its moral beliefs is, as the dissent 
states, "an astounding view of the law.,,34 By refusing to 
consider whether there is a relationship between the 
entity's asserted moral basis for exclusion and the 
evidence of its moral views, the Court ignores the 
possibility that the excluder's morality claim is merely a 
litigation posture. Undertaking the individualized 
examination required by Rotary and Jaycees does not mean 
that the Dale Court inevitably would have concluded that 
there was no material impairment of the Boy Scouts' 
message. Assume that the Supreme Court had reviewed the 
Scouts' expression and determined that compliance with the 
statute would conflict with the entity's moral views. In such 
a case, I may have disagreed with the Court's interpretation 
of the facts. It is unlikely, however, that I would have been 
nearly as alarmed about the opinion's impact on civil rights 
laws-particularly for groups protected by statute but not 
afforded heightened constitutional scrutiny.35 Instead, the 
Dale majority has chosen an approach that appears to 
effectively disable courts from ensuring that an 
organization's violation of antidiscrimination law is 
grounded in its expression and is not simply a cover for 
the very type of hostility at which the legislation is aimed. 
B. MORAL EXPRESSION OR MERE PREJUDICE? 
The Dale majority's acceptance of the Boy Scouts' 
bald declaration that their violation of New Jersey's civil 
rights statute was based on their moral views may 
effectively render civil rights protections for many groups 
little more than hortatory. Equal treatment of most classes 
protected under antidiscrimination statutes, including those 
based on race, sex, sexual orientation, marital status and 
disability, have been or continue to be subject to moraIity-
based objections. Most, if not all, of the groups commonly 
protected by antidiscrimination statutes have at some time 
been subject to moral condemnation: Less than 40 years 
ago, for instance, the trial judge in Loving v. Virginia ruled 
that "Almighty God created the races ... placed them on 
separate continents ... [and] did not intend for the races to 
mix.,,36 Women were consigned, as Justice Bradley wrote 
in Bradwell v. Illinois, by "the law of the Creator" to "the 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother.,,37 Marital 
status, too, has been a basis of moral disapproval: in the 
past, objections typically concerned the condemnation of 
divorce; today, the conflict more often takes the form of 
refusals to rent apartments to unmarried, cohabitating 
couples?8 There is likewise a long history of moral 
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opposition to persons with certain disabilities, whether it be 
the early belief that the mentally ill were demon-possessed39 
or the modem-day declaration that AIDS is a punishment 
inflicted upon its sufferers for their "immoral behavior.'.4O 
The belief that African Americans should not marry 
Caucasians, or that women should not be lawyers-both 
once enshrined in the law as moral certainty-today are 
generally regarded as being grounded in mere prejudice. 
This evolution suggests that the line between "moral 
opposition" and "animus" can be thin indeed. Even the 
language that we use muddles the two. For instance, a 
person who says, "Gay people are bad" could be expressing 
moral disapproval, mere dislike, or both. Although the 
question of whether "pure" animosity can exist detached 
from any moral viewpoint is at some level unanswerable, 
one strand of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence 
suggests that the law views some discriminatory conduct as 
that which is undertaken for its own sake and which has no 
legitimate social value. In a line of cases including United 
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,41 City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,42 and Romer v. 
Evans,43 the Supreme Court-applying its most lenient 
standard of review, the rational basis test-has overturned 
laws upon finding that they were enacted based on hostility 
towards a class of persons. 
In Romer v. Evans, for example, the Supreme Court 
struck down an amendment to the Colorado constitution 
("Amendment 2") which nullified eXIstIng 
antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, bisexuals, and 
gay men and which prohibited the enactment of such laws in 
the future.44 The Court was faced with the issue of whether 
the Amendment's passage was based on a "bare . . . desire 
to harm"45 gay persons or was instead a legitimate attempt 
"to preserve traditional sexual mores.'.46 The state in Romer 
argued that Amendment 2 was enacted out of "respect for 
other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the 
liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or 
religious objections to homosexuality.,,47 The Supreme 
Court flatly rejected Colorado's argument; even under the 
highly deferential "rationality review" standard, the Court 
concluded, "[t]he breadth of the amendment is so far 
removed from these particular justifications that we find it 
impossible to credit them.,,48 
I am not arguing that the Romer Court necessarily 
adopted the view that sheer animus is bereft of ideological 
content. Although Colorado claimed that it had an interest 
in protecting the associational rights of landlords and 
employers, the Court did not credit this rationale and hence 
did not undertake a First Amendment analysis.49 The 
Supreme Court also may take a darker view of actions 
motivated by animus when the actor is the state (as in 
Romer) rather than a private group (as in Dale): Given the 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and free 
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association, private CIuzens have far greater leeway to 
discriminate than does the government. Moreover, it was 
crucial to the majority's decision that Amendment 2 had the 
effect of denying gay men and lesbians the ability to use the 
normal political processes to protect themselves from 
discrimination.5o Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in cases 
such as Romer, Cleburne, and Moreno appears to 
contemplate a form of "pure" animosity that has no social 
or expressive value. In Romer the majority concluded its 
opinion by encapsulating the wrong of Amendment 2: 
"[It] classifies homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. 
This Colorado cannot do. ,,51 Assuming this is a plausible 
reading of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence and 
applying it in the context of Dale, New Jersey would have 
an extremely strong interest in protecting groups even 
from private hostility, on the ground that bare animosity is 
not only useless but toxic as well. 
The Boy Scouts appear to have capitalized on the 
court's difficulty in distinguishing between morality- and 
animus-based claims. Despite nearly twenty years of 
litigation, the Boy Scouts have not explained how their 
ban is related to their moral views other than to say that 
being gay conflicts with "traditional moral values.,,52 
Counsel for the Boy Scouts opened his argument before 
the Supreme Court by claiming that Boy Scouting is "so 
closely identified with traditional moral values that the 
phrase 'He's a real Boy Scout' has entered the common 
language.,,53 Yet the Boy Scouts nowhere discuss what 
the phrase "traditional moral values" means to them, or 
how these values relate to homosexuality. They instead 
adopt an "it goes without saying" approach; because there 
is a long history of moral opposition to homosexuality, the 
Boy Scouts seem to imply, their ban on gay members must 
be based in morality. Crucially, though, the Boy Scouts 
overlook the fact that there is also a long history of hatred, 
violence, and state-sponsored discrimination against gay 
men and lesbians. As the party claiming an exemption 
from a civil rights statute, the Boy Scouts should at least 
be able to state why inclusion of gay members is 
incompatible with their set of values. Given the 
longstanding hostility towards gay men and lesbians, a 
court should (although the Dale majority did not) take 
seriously the possibility that the Boy Scouts' opposition 
could be grounded in antipathy. 
C. WHAT ABOUT THE STATE'S INTEREST IN 
SAFEGUARDING CIVIL RIGHTS? 
By allowing a blanket statement of "morality" to 
exempt excluders from a nondiscrimination statute, the 
Court in Dale ignores a state's numerous and weighty 
interests in the equal treatment of its citizens. Civil rights 
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laws are an attempt to address the myriad harms that flow 
from discrimination, such as job loss, emotional trauma, 
physical distress, decreased productivity, and disruption of 
family life. In particular, state and local governments are 
becoming increasingly aware of the enormous personal and 
social costs of discrimination against gay men, bisexuals, 
and lesbians. As of October, 1999, 11 states and more than 
100 counties and municipalities had passed sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination laws.54 In light of this 
legislation, the Court's discussion of antidiscrimination 
statutes in Dale is troubling. The majority's disagreement 
with New Jersey's substantive choices in enacting and 
interpreting its civil rights statute is unmistakable; the Court 
all but says that the state went too far: 
New Jersey's statutory definition of 'a place of 
public accommodation' is extremely broad. The 
term is said to 'include, but not be limited to,' a 
list of over 50 types of places . . .. But the 
statute also includes places that often may not 
carry with them open invitations to the public ... 
. In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
went a step further and applied its public 
accommodations law to a private entity without 
even attempting to tie the term 'place' to a 
physical location.55 
The majority seems to imply that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court must have erred in applying its statute to the 
Boy Scouts, as such a result had never been reached before: 
''Four State Supreme Courts and one United States Court of 
Appeals have ruled that the Boy Scouts is not a place of 
public accommodation. No federal appellate court or state 
supreme court-except the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
this case-has reached a contrary result"S6 The Court's 
patent disagreement with the statute's application, a 
question of state law beyond its jurisdiction, raises the 
possibility that the majority may have altered the course of 
its expressive association cases to achieve the desired result, 
effectively gutting many statutory civil rights protections. 
The majority's opinion further suggests that any 
transformation rendered by its decision may not have been 
accidental. The Court's discussion of antidiscrimination 
laws, especially when combined with questions posed by 
the Justices in oral argument, suggests that there may be a 
majority of the Court which believes that a state's interest in 
prohibiting discrimination varies depending on the category 
of persons protected. If true, this approach arguably 
constitutes a departure from the Court's prior expressive 
association jurisprudence. In Rotary, for instance, the 
Court-without qualification as to the category of persons 
protected-emphasized that "public accommodations laws 
'plainly serve compelling state interests of the highest 
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order.",s7 Similarly, in requiring another private club to 
comply with a local gender nondiscrimination ordinance, 
the Court in New York State Club Association v. New York 
stated, "[1]t is relevant to note that the Court has recognized 
the State's 'compelling interest' in combating invidious 
discrimination."s8 
At oral argument in Dale, in contrast, several Justices 
asked whether the state's interest varied depending on the 
classification of persons protected. For example, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist referenced a New York City ordinance 
prohibiting discrimination based on a person's criminal 
record and asked, ''But wouldn't the State's interest be 
weaker if we're talking about, say, ex-convicts being 
discriminated against than it would about blacks being 
discriminated against?"S9 In a footnote to the majority's 
opinion, Justice Rehnquist notes in a tone bordering on the 
derisive: 
Public accommodations laws have ... expanded 
beyond those groups that have been given 
heightened equal protection scrutiny . . .. Some 
... have even expanded to cover criteria such as 
prior criminal record, prior psychiatric treatment, 
military status, personal appearance, source of 
income, place of residence, and political 
ideology.6o 
This position is an ironic one for Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who typically urges citizens to go to the legislature mther 
than seek antidiscrimination protection in the Constitution.61 
If the Supreme Court were to adopt an approach in 
which the state's interest in nondiscrimination depends on 
the category of persons protected, then the state's interest in 
nearly every category covered by its antidiscrimination laws 
would be thrown into question. Only the categories of mce 
(along with national origin and alienage), gender, and 
illegitimacy have thus far been determined to receive 
heightened constitutional scrutiny.62 This leaves a state 
open to an excluder's claim that the state has only a weak 
interest in nondiscrimination prohibitions on a variety of 
other grounds, such as age, pregnancy, veteran's status, 
disability, marital status, and sexual orientation. It is also 
conceivable that an excluder could assert that a hierarchy 
exists among categories unprotected by heightened review, 
which would make legislative choices vulnemble to a 
court's subjective views on whether the prohibition against 
discrimination based on, say, pregnancy, is more or less 
weighty than the interest in protecting individuals regardless 
of age or disability. A state's interest in ensuring equal 
treatment of gay men and lesbians would be particularly 
vulnemble to devaluation, given that sexual orientation 
protections remain the subject of heated debate. 
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There is a strong argument, though, that a state's 
interest in antidiscrimination is always due the utmost 
deference by a court because passage of a 
nondiscrimination statute represents a form of legislative 
fact-finding. By enacting a civil rights law, the argument 
runs, the legislature has determined that the specified forms 
of discrimination have no place in an arena deemed 
sufficiently public. It is a legislative command of equal 
treatment, and as such, constitutes a compelling state 
interest-one to which the judiciary owes deference. 
D. HURLEY: WHAT BANNER Is JAMES DALE FLYING? 
The Supreme Court in Dale based its holding 
primarily on its decision in Hurley, a case concerning the 
private sponsor of a Saint Patrick's Day parade who refused 
to allow a lesbian and gay pride organization, the Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 
("GLIB") to march in the parade.63 The Supreme Court 
struck down, as a violation of free speech, the application of 
a state antidiscrimination law to the parade organizers. The 
majority analogized James to GLIB, reasoning that: 
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. 
Patrick's Day parade would have interfered with 
the parade organizers' choice not to propound a 
particular point of view, the presence of James as 
an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely 
interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to 
propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.64 
There are a number of flaws with the Dale Court's 
reasoning. One is the majority's failure to distinguish a 
pure speech claim from an expressive association defense, 
particularly in the context of statutory prohibitions against 
discrimination. In contrast to a pure speech claim, the right 
of expressive association is a correlative right that exists in 
order to protect First Amendment liberties; as a result, a 
defendant claiming a right of expressive association must 
affirmatively demonstrate the basis for her claim.65 In a 
separate dissent in Dale, Justice Souter-the author of 
Hurley-explained that in contrast to a claim of expressive 
association, a pure speech claim "if bona fide, may be taken 
at face value in applying the First Amendment.,,66 
The parade in Hurley illustrates why it is important for 
courts to give greater "breathing room" to pure speech 
claims. Like a broadcast or a protest march, the parade was, 
rather than expressive association, a quintessential form of 
speech. The parade provided a time-limited opportunity for 
the marchers to communicate their point. As the majority 
stated in Hurley, in parades, "performers define ... what 
subjects and ideas are available for communication ... [by] 
marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not 
just to each other but to bystanders along the way.,,67 The 
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members of GLIB had wanted to participate in the parade in 
order to make a point: they desired to march behind a 
banner and distribute fact sheets, which conveyed that they 
were Irish, gay, and proud of both.68 In fact, GLIB had 
formed for the very purpose of expressing this message in 
the particular context of Boston's Saint Patrick Day's 
parade.69 The circumstance of an expressive association 
case is quite different: the possibility of excluding a member 
is a constant, on-going process. As Justice Stevens 
explained in his Dale dissent: 
This is why a different kind of scrutiny must be 
given to an expressive association claim [than to 
a pure speech claim], lest the right of expressive 
association simply tum into a right to 
discriminate whenever some group can think of 
an expressive object that would seem to be 
inconsistent with the admission of some person 
as a member.7o 
The majority in Dale, however, concluded that 
"Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would ... force the 
organization to send a message . . . that [it] accepts 
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.,,7l 
This conclusion rests on the Supreme Court's faulty 
assumption that James' "presence" (being gay) is all about 
sexual conduct. The majority fails to recognize either the 
vast complex of attributes that make up a person's intimate 
attractions and romantic love or the shared experience of 
discrimination based on these attractions and loves. In the 
same vein, the majority characterizes James as a "gay rights 
activist,,,n presuming activism from James' openness, 
outside the context of Scouting, about his sexual orientation. 
The only arguable evidence of activism was a newspaper 
article interviewing James in his position as co-president of 
his college's gay student alliance in which he discussed his 
process of "coming out" as gay?3 As Justice Stevens 
pointed out, though, the article did not even "remotely 
suggest" that James would advocate any views on 
homosexuality to his troOp.74 
The Court likewise refused to distinguish James' 
personal beliefs about sexual orientation (that gay and non-
gay sexual orientations are equally worthy of respect) from 
the question of whether he would discuss these beliefs with 
troop members. James argued that he had not and would 
not discuss sexuality with members.75 In response, the 
majority stated that the Boy Scouts could select leaders who 
"teach only by example,,,76 thereby simultaneously 
depicting James as the embodiment of sex and as the feared 
homosexual "recruiter" who can teach simply by being. At 
oral argument, counsel for the Boy Scouts similarly claimed 
that James, like the members of GLIB, carried a banner. 
James "put a banner around his neck" when his sexual 
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orientation became known to the Scouts, counsel declared, 
and "[h]e can't take that banner off.'.77 In dissent, Justice 
Stevens replied that "[u]nder the majority's reasoning," 
James' banner was "irreversibly affixed," and it read 
'''h al ",78 B ham·· th B omosexu . y re-c ctenzmg e oy Scouts' 
exclusion of James as based on his expression rather than on 
his status, the majority effectively does an end-run around 
the principle that discrimination in itself is not protected 
expression.79 
In one of many attempts to peel apart the Dale 
majority's equation of gayness with sexual activity and its 
advocacy, James presented evidence that the Boy Scouts do 
not require heterosexual Scout leaders who disagree with 
the policy to be banned from the organization. After noting 
that this evidence was contested, the majority declared that 
even if such differential treatment existed, it was 
"irrelevant" to the Court's analysis.8o According to the 
majority, James' sexual orientation made all the difference: 
''The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights 
activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a 
distinctly different message from the presence of a 
heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as 
disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.',81 
The Supreme Court made no attempt to explain the 
nature of this distinctive difference. If anything, inclusion 
of the heterosexual leader who supports gay rights and 
disagrees with the Boy Scouts arguably sends a stronger 
message, given that leader's open and direct disagreement 
with the ban. The majority also overlooked the fact that 
Scout leaders are instructed to refrain from discussing 
sexual issues within the troop and are told to direct the boys 
to their parents, teachers, or religious leaders.82 No 
evidence was presented, nor did the Boy Scouts argue, that 
James would violate this directive. As Justice Stevens 
noted in dissent, the Boy Scouts affirmatively encourage 
leaders to participate in civic and religious life, even though 
the organization is politically and religiously non-partisan: 
"[T]here is no basis for [the Boy Scouts] to presume that a 
homosexual will be unable to comply with [their] policy not 
to discuss sexual matters any more than it would presume 
that politically or religiously active members could not 
resist the urge to proselytize or politicize during troop 
meetings.,,83 
Given the absence of any suggestion that James 
would be likely to violate the Boy Scouts' prohibition 
against discussing sexuality within the troop setting, it 
seems inescapable that the Supreme Court's decision was 
based not on anything James might say or do but on who 
he is. The majority's reasoning not only pennits the Court 
to avoid the application of the civil rights statute, but may 
have even greater repercussions. Recalling another 
ignominious chapter of the Supreme Court's history by 
evoking Plessy v. Ferguson,84 the Dale dissent suggested 
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that the Court is similarly constitutionalizing 
discrimination here. "Though unintended," the dissent 
stated, the majority's reliance on James' openness as a gay 
man to justify his exclusion "is tantamount to a 
constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority.',85 
II. THE BOY SCOUTS' BAN: A REVIEW OF THE 
EVIDENCE 
The United States Supreme Court accepted, on its 
face, the Boy Scouts' claim that their ban on gay members 
was based upon the organization's moral views. The 
Court did not attempt to detennine whether the ban was 
consistent with evidence of the Scouts' moral 
expression.86 A sampling of what the evidence might look 
like appears below.87 I do not undertake this review to 
argue that the Boy Scouts' ban is necessarily based on 
hostility, but for the more limited purpose of illustrating 
that, had the Court carried out the analysis required by the 
Jaycees-Rotary line of cases, there was overwhelming 
evidence to support the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
conclusion that the ban collides so directly with the 
Scouts' moral teachings that the only possible basis for the 
ban is animus. 
A. THE SCOPE OF THE BAN 
In spite of having litigated a number of suits filed by 
expelled gay Scouts over the past two decades,88 the Boy 
Scouts have left the scope and content of their policy 
banning gay members improbably vague. In fact, the Boy 
Scouts have never mentioned the words "homosexuality" or 
"gay" in any of their manuals, handbooks, or guides 
directed to either Scout leaders or youth members.89 Nor 
have they stated in these materials that they hav.e a policy of 
barring members who are gay, which led Justice Souter to 
remark that the policy appeared to be a "sort of Boy Scout 
I ,,90 D .. th f th common aw. etennmmg e contours 0 e Scouts' 
policy requires sifting through several sources of 
information and then piecing the fragments together. The 
first two sources of information consist of the Boy Scouts' 
written materials and what they have done in practice-the 
known occasions on which the Boy Scouts have banned gay 
members. The third source concerns what the Boy Scouts 
say they would do in various situations posed by the Justices 
at oral argument in Dale. The responses to these hypotheti-
cals provide what appears to be the most detailed evidence 
of the Boy Scouts' policy to date. 
The Boy Scouts argue that the inclusion of gay 
members in the organization is contrary to the Scout oath 
and law.91 There is no doubt that the Scouts hold out to 
their members the oath and law as the basis for their moral 
code. The Boy Scout Handbook ("Scout Handbook") 
explains that the oath and law embody "[t]he principles of 
the Boy Scouts of America" and states that a boy "will be 
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expected to live by these standards [as] a Boy SCOUt.,,92 As 
one of the first requirements for advancing in the Scout 
ranks, a boy must recite the Scout oath and law from 
memory, as well as explain their meaning "in [his] own 
words.,,93 In taking the oath, a Scout pledges to "do [his] 
best to do [his] duty to God and [his] country and to obey 
the Scout law: [t]o help other people at all times; [t]o keep 
[himself] physically strong, mentally awake, and morally 
straight.,,94 The Scout law provides that a Scout is 
"trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, 
obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent.,,95 As 
grounds for their ban, the Boy Scouts point in particular to 
the provisions of the oath and law which state that a Scout 
must be "morally straight" and "clean.,,96 
Given the Boy Scouts' requirement that members 
learn and understand the meaning of the oath and law, it is 
not surprising that the Scout Handbook explains the 
"morally straight" and "clean" provisions to the boys. What 
is surprising, however, are the explanations themselves, 
both in their content and for their silence. Much of their 
substance is arguably antithetical to the Boy Scouts' ban on 
gay members. For instance, the explanation of "morally 
straight" states that a Scout "should respect and defend the 
rights of all people" and that his "relationships with others 
should be honest· and open.'.97 The Scout Handbook's 
section on being "clean" states that "[t]here's another kind 
of dirt ... that can't be scrubbed away," giving as examples 
'jokes that make fun of ethnic groups or people with 
physical or mental limitations" and "racial slurs.,,98 
The Scout Handbook's explanations of the "morally 
straight" and "clean" provisions are also notable for what 
they do not say. Neither passage refers to sexuality, much 
less homosexuality.99 The Boy Scouts argue that they are 
not required to set forth a list of what is not "morally 
straight" or "clean" in order to be exempted from 
antidiscrimination laws. loo This may be correct, but it is 
beside the point: the Scouts devote an entire section, entitled 
"Sexual Responsibility," to discussing a boy's sexual 
relationships.lOl Despite having consistently based their 
claim for exemption on a purported link between being 
"morally straight," "clean," and heterosexual, the Boy 
Scouts have never revised the Scout Handbook to make the 
link explicit. Nor does the Scout Handbook tell the boys 
that the terms "morally straight" and "clean" have anything 
to do with sexuality at all. These inconsistencies between 
the evidence and the Scouts' litigation position provide 
strong grounds for the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
determination that the Boy Scouts' ban is indistinguishable 
from animus. 
In addition to invoking the "morally straight" and 
"clean" provisions of the Scout oath and law, the Boy 
Scouts' argument relies on position statements that they 
drafted in response to litigation.102 A Boy Scout member 
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would have had only one opportunity, in the past two 
decades of litigation, to read in Scout literature about the 
ban: in an article published for adult members in a 1992 
issue of the Boy Scout leaders' magazine. 103 Apart from the 
1992 statement, the Scouts have issued four similar 
statements, which were sent only to the Boy Scouts' public 
relations officials. I04 These do little to illuminate the 
substance of the Scouts' ban on gay members. Probably the 
most complete explanation is found in a public relations 
statement from 1991, yet it consists of no more than the 
conclusory assertion that being gay conflicts with their 
moral expression: "We believe that homosexual conduct is 
inconsistent with the requirement . . . that a Scout be 
morally straight and ... clean ... [based upon] our desire to 
provide the appropriate environment and role models which 
reflect Scouting's values and beliefs.,,105 Thus, even the 
Boy Scouts' most complete statement of their policy is 
nothing more than a reiteration of their ''because we say so" 
approach. Moreover, even assuming that these position 
statements had articulated why homosexual conduct is 
"inconsistent" with the Scouts' moral code, the statements' 
inaccessibility to members suggests that they may not reflect 
the message actually conveyed to its members by the 
organization. 
A source to which the Boy Scouts point in support of 
their ban against gay members is the fact of litigation itself. 
While there have been numerous lawsuits challenging the 
policy,106 this litigation has done little to clarify the terms or 
scope of the Boy Scouts' policy. Neither the issues nor the 
factual scenarios raised in the litigated cases have differed 
much from one another: they involve the exclusion of an 
adult member whom the Scouts learned was gay.107 In their 
arguments, the Boy Scouts make numerous references to 
past litigation, as when counsel for the Boy Scouts 
concluded his Supreme Court argument by noting that 
"we've been in litigation on this precise issue for the last 19 
years.,,108 Although not clearly articulated, the gist of the 
Boy Scouts' reasoning appears to be that, if they have been 
fighting over this issue for so long, their moral opposition 
must be sincere and strongly held. While that is one 
possible conclusion to be drawn from the time, money, and 
passion which the Boy Scouts have doubtless expended, the 
same evidence points to another conclusion as well: the 
possibility that the Boy Scouts' energies have been fueled 
by animosity. 
The final source of information concerning the 
contours of the Boy Scouts' policy consists of the answers 
that counsel for the Scouts provided to the Justices' 
questions during oral argument. At oral argument, the 
Justices repeatedly called the Boy Scouts' policy 
"confusing,,,109 and they devoted many questions to simply 
attempting to determine what, exactly, constitutes the 
Scouts' policy. The primary aim of their questions 
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appeared to focus on determining whether the ban is based 
on a member's conduct, status, expression, or some 
combination thereof. One of the Justices, for example, 
asked, "Are you saying the policy is don't ask, don't tell, or 
is the policy, if you are gay you are not welcome in 'the Boy 
Scouts? Which is it?"llo The Justices also asked, "What 
about the heterosexual Scout leader who openly espouses 
the view that homosexuality is consistent with Scout law 
and oath ... ?"lll "[W]hat if someone is homosexual in the 
sense of having a sexual orientation in that direction but 
does not engage in any homosexual conduct?"ll2 ''Does 
that go for [heterosexual] cohabiters also?"ll3 
The result is a patchwork of answers, some of which 
appear to fit together and many of which clash outright. 
Counsel for the Boy Scouts claimed that the policy is based 
on "expression and conduct . .. not ... statuS."ll4 Yet 
when asked whether James would have been banned had he 
been a heterosexual advocate for gay rights in identical 
circumstances, counsel's response was that a heterosexual in 
the same situation would not necessarily have been 
expelled: "[1]t would be open to the Scouts to conclude that 
somebody who is himself presenting a personal example [by 
being gay] ... might be more unacceptable than somebody 
[heterosexual] who was merely advocating."lls A further 
indication that the policy is based on the mere fact of a 
member's sexual orientation is counsel's statement that even 
if an openly gay Scout agreed to remain celibate, the 
member would be barred because ''being openly 
homosexual . . . communicates the concept that this is 
okay.,,116 Another aspect of the policy revealed during oral 
argument is that, similar to the United States' military 
policy,117 the Boy Scouts "don't ask" if a member is gay, 
but they will ban him from the organization regardless of 
who "tells." Unlike the military's policy, however, the Boy 
Scouts do not state in any materials available to applicants 
that they expel gay members.ll8 Lastly, the oral argument 
disclosed that there are two ways in which a gay member 
may remain in the Scouts. The first is if the Boy Scouts are 
unaware of a member's sexual orientation, since "[t]he 
policy is not to inquire."ll9 The second is the only option 
for a gay member whose sexual orientation becomes known 
to the Scouts and who promises to be celibate: he can 
remain in the organization on the (literally) demoralizing 
condition that he affirmatively tell the other members that 
being gay is immoral. 120 
B. EVIDENCE OF THE BOY SCOUTS' MORAL CODE 
Although documentation of the Boy Scouts' 
exclusionary policy is scant, evidence of their overall moral 
code is abundant As they explain in one of their leader's 
guides, the Boy Scouts incorporate games and projects into 
Scout meetings that are designed to help the boys learn 
basic social and moral precepts, such as learning "to follow 
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rules, to take turns, to respect the rights of others, to give 
and take, and to play fair."I2I The Boy Scouts' guides, 
manuals, and handbooks provide a rich source of materials 
to aid a court in determining whether the ban is consistent 
with their moral expression. The three values which the 
Boy Scouts name as the underpinning for their moral views 
are "honesty," ''fairness,'' and "respect for others.,,122 
Central to the Scouts' commentaries on fairness and respect 
for others are the principles of equal treatment and 
inclusiveness. In the leader's guide, Making Ethical 
Decisions, the Boy Scouts explain ''fairness'': ''To treat 
someone unfairly is to say, 'You don't have the same rights 
as others.' Unfairness is treating one person worse than 
others for no good reason, as occurs in various sorts of 
discrimination."I23 In another leaders' guide, the Boy 
Scouts define "discrimination" in a way that would directly 
apply to their ban on gay members, as "[k]eeping someone 
from something they want to do or join because they belong 
to a certain groUp."I24 The Boy Scouts similarly discuss 
"respect for others" largely in terms of accepting differences 
among peoplel2S and they caution boys not to use status-
based characteristics to form judgments about people or as a 
basis for unequal treatment 126 
Significantly, one of the status-based categories for 
which the Boy Scouts urge respect is "sexuality," a term that 
a court could easily determine encompasses homosexuality. 
Indeed, given the context in which the word is used - a 
statement in The Scoutmaster Handbook that it is the 
leader's responsibility to "steer Scouts away" from any 
''forms of negativity that denigrate people based upon their 
gender or sexuality"127 -it is difficult to imagine that the 
Boy Scouts could have meant "sexuality" in any sense other 
than "homosexuality." If "sexuality" is so interpreted, then 
the Boy Scouts have actually included respectful treatment 
of gay people as part of their moral values. 
In their discussions of fairness and respect, the Boy 
Scouts often refer to the importance of antidiscrimination 
laws. For instance, one leader's guide states, "even though 
it is part of the American way. .. to talk about 'equality for 
all,' old attitudes have not always kept pace with the newer 
laws that guarantee civil rights.,,128 One of the Boy Scouts' 
suggested activities is to "[l]ead a discussion on the rights of 
Scout-age youth-including the right . . . to inform 
authorities if someone is being treated unjustly [and] to use 
public facilities on the same basis as all other citizens.,,129 
The Boy Scouts even acknowledge that compliance with the 
law can sometimes be burdensome. In fact, they suggest 
that leaders explicitly recognize this burden in their 
discussions with the boys and point out that the burden is 
outweighed by society's interest Making Ethical Decisions 
states that "[t]he important point for young people to learn 
is that, though fairness and restraint may not make them 
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'best off,' they will be better off than in a society where 
there are no rules constraining [their] actions.,,130 
The Boy Scouts' discussions of "honesty" stress the 
importance of being open with others about oneself. For 
instance, the "morally straight" provision of the Scout oath 
explains to boys that "your relationships with others should 
be honest and open."t31 "The freedom that we all cherish in 
our society," the Boy Scouts state, "is based on the capacity 
of people to have honest relationships.,,132 A court could 
find, though, that the Scouts' ban on gay members is on a 
collision course with their emphasis on honesty. As part of 
their exclusionary policy, the Boy Scouts state that they 
"mak[e] no effort to discover the sexual orientation of any 
person," yet another component of their ban is that they will 
expel anyone whom they learn is gay.133 Similar to the 
military's "Don't Ask; Don't Tell" policy, persons who 
successfully conceal their sexual orientation are permitted to 
remain in the organization. 134 As some courts have 
concluded in the military context, such a policy discourages 
people from being honest with others about their sexual 
orientation and may encourage gay members to lie about 
themselves and their lives.135 The policy also encourages 
gay members, in opposition to the Boy Scouts' moral tenet 
of openness, to keep their personal lives shrouded in 
secrecy. 
The Scouts' ban is arguably inconsistent with another 
aspect of their moral code: their assertion that 
homosexuality itself is immoral. If the Boy Scouts believe 
that gay people are immoral, then it is surprising that they 
would knowingly allow closeted gay men to be Scout 
leaders. There is no evidence to suggest that a person who 
conceals his sexual orientation will be more "moral" than 
one who is open; indeed, the converse may be true. The 
Boy Scouts could argue that they exclude gay leaders not 
because the leaders are gay, but because of the "message" 
that being gay sends: If no one knows that a particular 
leader is gay, then no message is being sent. As Justice 
Souter observed at oral argument, though, no plaintiff "is 
using the Boy Scouts ... for expression.,,136 Furthermore, 
during the Supreme Court argument, counsel for the Scouts 
made no distinction between being an openly gay Scout and 
discussing sexual orientation at Scout meetings. Invoking 
Hurley, counsel stated that James had a permanently affixed 
banner around his neck.137 If the Boy Scouts' claim for an 
antidiscrimination exemption was based on their belief that 
gay people are immoral (rather than on hostility), one might 
expect the Scouts to take all feasible steps to ensure that no 
gay person acts as a Scout leader. The Boy Scouts, 
however, do not even take the simple steps of asking 
applicants for leadership positions whether they are gay, or 
of including a statement in their manuals which explains 
their view that being gay is incompatible with being a Scout. 
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In a final twist, despite their emphasis on role-
modeling, the Boy Scouts state that they will allow an 
openly gay man to be a leader on the condition that he tell 
the boys that his homosexuality is immoral. 138 This 
imposed condition runs headlong into other Boy Scout 
values. In the pamphlet that boys must read to get their 
"Family Life" merit badge, for example, the Boy Scouts 
emphasize the importance of self-esteem: "People who feel 
good about themselves help make the family secure. In 
contrast, troubled family members with low self-esteem may 
be distrustful and suspicious of others.,,139 If openly gay 
members are allowed to remain in the organization only if 
they stand before the group and forswear their sexual 
orientation, to hold themselves up as an example of what 
not to be, this would be entirely consistent with an anirnus-
based policy. It is unclear which would be more punishing 
to a Scout member, being expelled from the organization or 
submitting to public humiliation and repudiation before his 
peers and charges. It is only by the thinnest technicality that 
the latter could be construed as "acceptance" of a gay 
member combined with the simultaneous rejection of his 
"message." 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Dale is in part a 
Bowers redux. By adopting the Boy Scouts' 
characterization of its ban at face value, the Court 
effectively has assumed (with some outer boundary of 
impermissible state action demarcated by Romer), that 
discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals is 
presumptively justifiable. Under this reading of Dale, the 
Court need not independently review the facts to weigh 
competing interests--even though the countervailing 
consideration is the prevention of the very discrimination at 
issue. The Court's approach threatens not only 
discrimination protections for gay persons, but protections 
for other groups as well. Especially vulnerable are 
classifications that have not been afforded heightened 
constitutional scrutiny and to which moral objections have 
been made, such as cohabitating couples or persons 
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Nor is the Dale majority's 
approach necessarily limited to the context of private clubs: 
other organizations subject to public accommodations 
statutes, such as some landlords and employers, could argue 
that their moral beliefs are violated by compliance with the 
law. By emphasizing the majority's flawed reasoning in 
Dale, civil rights advocates hopefully can cabin the 
decision's effect and safeguard the states' interest in 
protecting civil rights. 
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